Griffith Taylor, 5 after the First World War, and Oskar Spate, 6 after the Second World War, drew attention to the country's isolated global position by centring their maps upon Canberra (see Fig. 1 ). 7 Since then, a legion of geographers in Australia and in other parts of the world have refined political geography's focus during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, provided fresh concepts and contemplated how the future geopolitical map may be moulded.
This raises the issue of how Dibb's life work fits into the pantheon of geostrategists who have long recognised geography as a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states? More specifically, how has his geographical training shaped his studies of the Soviet Union and his subsequent influence on reshaping Australia's defence policy? How have his contemporaries viewed his input into this arena, which recognises, like Mackinder, that the rise and fall of states, and prospects for war or peace have been heavily influenced by the balance of power between continental and maritime states? These are crucial issues, given the Australian Government has produced a new Defence white paper to guide the country's defence planning to 2035.
Before evaluating Dibb's role as a geographer in fashioning defence policy in Australia, it is pertinent to examine his early training at the Nottingham University that triggered his abiding interest in the geography of the Soviet Union and, after 1991, Russia, and more recently China. Then we are in a position to consider how his proposition that geography is a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states has infused Australia's defence planning, adverse reactions to Dibb's views, and his vigorous counter response that reinforces the critical importance of possessing a geographical imagination in both regional and global affairs. 
Soviet Geography
How did Dibb's enduring concern with Soviet geography from an Australian perspective arise? As this may seem to be an uncommon focus for a Yorkshireman born Paul Leonard Dibb at the beginning of the Second World War in the coalmining settlement of Pontefract, which was dominated by the Prince of Wales Colliery, it is important to trace key stages in this process. Dibb's stepfather was a miner and he inherited his mother's ambition, which was nurtured further as a scholarship boy at the Kings School, Pontefract, where teachers interested him in the world of ideas.
10 Between 1957 and 1960 these ideas and their applications were refined at the Nottingham University when he was a student in the Department of Geography led by Professor K.C. Edwards who, coincidentally, had many connections with geographers in the Antipodes during the 1950s and early 1960s.
11 Although majoring in geography, Dibb also undertook a subsidiary in economics under Professor Brian Tew (formerly of the University of Adelaide) and was offered the opportunity of pursuing an honours degree in the subject. He decided that sticking to a geography degree, without neglecting his interest in economics, would better suit his future career.
His curiosity about the USSR stemmed from John Cole, his Sydneyborn lecturer at Nottingham University, who was prominent among a bevy of postwar, British-based geographers studying the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War.
12 After being force-fed during the immediate postwar era on G. 18 While in the public service, Dibb was also conscious of the need to keep abreast of developments in geography, which was in the process of shifting from a qualitative perspective to a quantitative approach.
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In 1964 Dibb was awarded a part-time public service scholarship to study in the Department of Geography, School of General Studies at The Australian National University (ANU) under Professor Andrew Learmonth. 20 While there he was mentored by the political geographer Alfred James 'Jim' Rose, who had investigated the danger to Australia's security lying in its northern approaches, noting that 'the importance of New Guinea and Indonesia to Australia arises from their role as buffers or shields between us and the greater powers to the north … India, China and Japan'. 21 and Khabarovsk, but also in Tokyo with businessmen from key Japanese trading companies and a struggling Australian firm, whose difficulties in trading through the Nakhodka port were taken up with a less than cooperative trade representative in the Soviet embassy (See Table 1 ). In 1969 an opportunity arose for Dibb to extend his stay at ANU to analyse the material collected in the Soviet Union beyond the agreed one year plus short extension in the Department of Politics when the Department of Geography in the RSPacS was subdivided into the Department of Biogeography and Geomorphology, and the Department of Human Geography. 25 The latter, undermanned department wanted to extend its involvement beyond the Pacific and South-East Asia and recruited him as an economic geographer on a three-year appointment as a senior research fellow to provide a deeper Australian perspective on the USSR's geography; this appointment satisfied the long-standing interest of Spate, the school's new Director, in the Soviet Union's geographical theory and practice. Dibb's one-year stay in the Department of Human Geography at ANU advanced the skills that stood him in good stead for the rest of his career. 27 At the time, the visit to ANU by US geographer David Harvey, who elaborated the development of a scientific approach to geographical problems (i.e. the role of theory in scientific explanation), took the so-called quantitative revolution in geography beyond mere quantification. 28 The value of this experience in gaining an understanding through scientific explanation is apparent in Dibb's later explorations of the connections between international trade, the export base, and the location and health of Australia's rural industries -a shift from the preoccupation of economists with countries to the geographer's concern with the variable impact of policies on specific regions within countries.
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The main outcome of Dibb's time at ANU was the broad-gauge regional study of the East Asian half of the Soviet Union. At the time a focus on the economic development of Siberia, stretching from the Urals to the Pacific, was a relative rarity among geographers working on the USSR. 30 Drawing upon the well-honed skills developed by regional geographers, Dibb's study of 'Pacific Siberia' focused on the area from the Pacific seaboard inland to the Yenisey (Yenisei) River (See Fig. 2) . 31 With a perceptive foreword by Rigby, this investigation evaluated what the Russians had accomplished, contemplated and projected within Siberia and their likely geopolitical reverberations on powerful neighbours, notably China and Japan, and more generally around the wider Pacific rim. The volume demonstrated his detailed understanding of the little-studied region, its particular geographical characteristics relating to permafrost, isolation, distance and transport costs on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and their consequences for human settlement and economic activities. By the time Dibb's book on Siberia was published in 1972, he had returned to the public service as an intelligence analyst in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) in the Department of Defence. This move did not diminish his continuing interest in the USSR's geography. During this period he also extended his purview to cover China's strategic interests and defence priorities in the 1980s. 33 His contribution showed that he had not lost touch with his geographical roots with his devising two maps showing: (a) a view of the world centred on Beijing with radiating circles at 5,000-kilometre intervals; and (b) the location of China's military regions and field armies, each with an estimated 43,000 men (See figs 3A and 3B ). These maps, reflecting the importance of both distance and terrain, underlined 'the important contribution of geography … to China's strategy of protracted defence'. 34 Dibb's twin focus on the USSR and China persisted when he returned from Defence to ANU in 1981, first to the Department of International Relations and then, two years later, to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC). In particular, he sought to continue this interest in examining: (a) the potential for global conflict over economic issues, notably oil; (b) the external relations of Pacific Island states; and (c) long-term threat assessments within Australia's strategic neighbourhood. 35 More specifically, the SDSC's Director, Bob O'Neill, encouraged him to produce a major book that sought to diminish the yawning void in accurate information on the USSR's military strength, economic capabilities and international relations; this topic provided a perfect foil to Desmond Ball's work on the United States. Although Dibb extended his reach beyond Siberia in The Soviet Union: An Incomplete Superpower to include the country's international relations with both Europe and the Middle East, he maintained a firm focus on the Pacific Ocean to provide a more integrated assessment of the USSR's strengths and weaknesses as a nation-state. 36 As this assessment, containing a critique of Mackinder's heartland theory, downplayed the threat to Australia of the USSR's air power, the Australian's reviewer Peter Samuel claimed that Dibb had dangerous illusions about Soviet realpolitik. 37 Nevertheless, the study's quality and originality shone through and resulted in the award of a doctorate by ANU in 1987 based on published work on the Soviet Union. 38 Subsequently, Dibb remained focused upon the Soviet Union's international relations. In April 1991 he was present in Moscow with one of the authors of this chapter, R. Gerard Ward, at a meeting on Pacific regional affairs between representatives of The Australian National University's RSPacS and the Soviet Academy's Institute of International Relations and Economic Affairs. At a side gathering, a Soviet apparatchik sought to change the nature of the discussion from academic to intelligence matters -a move that Dibb immediately recognised from past experience and closed off! This suggested business as usual but, by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had dissolved into independent republics, which also signalled the end of the Cold War. On reflection, Dibb thought that it was not possible to have foreseen the Soviet Union's impending dissolution because of the wide knowledge gap that existed on its economic, social and ideological base. Indeed, the Soviet Union's subsequent breakup impressed upon him the need to employ an interdisciplinary team to provide the broadest possible perspective in a continuing watching brief on both Russia's and China's prospects. Inevitably, in his view, given Australia's geopolitical situation, such a team would of necessity include a political geographer. 
Australia's Strategic Geography
After returning to ANU in 1981 as a senior research fellow in arms control, disarmament and peace research, Dibb saw the need, following a review of Australia's external relations in the decade after the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, 40 to instil in Australians the belief that they could defend themselves. 41 He realised that this shift from a dependent to a self-reliant military strategy required the injection of a missing geographical perspective into Australia's defence policy to meet the request from the United States that its ally carry a greater burden of the security task. 42 In 1985 he was given the opportunity to elaborate his thesis that the fundamentals of Australia's geographical location should be key factors shaping military posture and force structure when was he was commissioned as a ministerial consultant to provide the first postwar review of the country's defence capabilities by the Minister for Defence Kim Beazley. 43 The resultant Dibb Review provided the springboard for Dibb again leaving ANU to become Director of the JIO (1986 to 1988) and then Deputy Secretary of Defence (1988 to 1991); he was also the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. 44 In 1991 Dibb returned once again to ANU with a special appointment as professor and head of SDSC (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) to focus on the future balance of power in Asia. 45 Our interest, however, is not on his career movements between the intelligence community and academia, but on the way in which he has used his geographical skills to mutually benefit both spheres of activity. This double act is evident in Dibb's model for Australia's strategic geography that became known as the 'Defence of Australia' (DOA) paradigm. 
Defence of Australia
Dibb's conceptual base for the DOA paradigm, prioritising air and naval forces to defend the sea-air gap north of Australia, took its cue from Sir Arthur Tange's astute observation that 'a map of one's own country is the most fundamental of all defence documentation'. 46 Given Australia was a 'middle ranking power' with modest defence resources, Dibb proposed a layered geographical construct to guide defence planning (See Fig. 4 ):
1. An area of direct military interest, accounting for 10 per cent of the globe, where attention should be concentrated upon securing the country from attack by another state by having a military technological advantage to defend the country's northern air and sea approaches through island or archipelagic states, and the inner arc of countries from or through which a threat could be mounted. 2. A broader area of primary strategic interest, covering 25 per cent of the globe from the mid-Indian Ocean in the west to the midPacific in the east and from South-East Asia and the China Sea in the north to Antarctica in the south. 3. The rest of the world that afforded opportunities for coalitions but was not a primary determinant of force structure.
This concentric-ring model was designed to provide Australia's defence strategists with an ironclad discipline to shape strategy and force structure; it also provided a construct to distinguish between 'wars-of-necessity' and 'wars-of-choice' (i.e. the difference between interventions in the Solomon Islands and East Timor versus Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan). 
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After returning to ANU in 1991, Dibb was able to maintain the DOA credo. He criticised severely the Australian role in peacekeeping in Africa because it was deflecting the defence force from its primary task of defending Australia, but he also advised Defence on its 1994 White Paper, which flagged a deeper concern with security interests and perceptions of Indian Ocean countries. 49 Fostering the security of the neighbourhood within Australia's immediate 'arc of instability' also led to him having direct involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum (ARF) and in determining the role and structure of Papua New Guinea's defence force. 50 Beyond Australia's region of prime military interest he argued that, given the cost of expeditionary forces, involvement supporting the United States should necessarily be limited to niche contributions. At the same time, soft diplomacy should be used to accommodate radical changes in Asian geopolitics following the economic crisis of 1997-98, which further exposed Japan's underlying economic weakness and catapulted China into the role of a leading East Asia power.
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The DOA paradigm prioritising 'proximity' held sway until after the United Nation's intervention in East Timor in 1999 and the 2000 Defence White Paper, which accommodated geopolitical changes with an additional concentric ring separating maritime South-East Asia from the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.
52 Although non-state actors, including international criminal elements and illegal immigrants, had been injected into the new millennium's post-Cold War strategic equation, Dibb cautioned at the time against restructuring Australia's military forces for constabulary actions. 53 As his position did not address the American challenge for Australia to play a greater role in the alliance, Paul Monk, a former Defence analyst, posed a dozen questions to Dibb. 54 Before these could be addressed, however, overseas events precipitated more fundamental criticisms of the DOA paradigm's underpinnings in strategic geography. 
Adverse Reactions
The destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the Bali bombings of 2002 prompted a statement from the Minister of Defence, Senator Robert Hill, that 'it probably never made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing circles around our coastline, but certainly does not do so now' given the globalised nature of security concerns. 55 This view was reinforced by Alan Dupont's argument that the international security landscape had been transformed and a new strategy was required more in keeping with the 'post-modern era of Osama bin Laden' than 'the premodern world of Halford Mackinder' due to technological advances in airpower and the power of ideology. 56 Besides giving insufficient weight to transnational threats and recognition that modern defence forces had to win both the peace and the war, Dupont contended that the traditional emphasis on geostrategic imperatives not only ignored the globalised nature of modern conflict but also shaped the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for the wrong wars. Above all, 'in an age of globalisation and transnational threats', Dupont claimed that 'geography matters far less that it once did due to the compressions of space and time'. 57 This rejection of geopolitical considerations gained traction in updates of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper, which gave greater support to expeditionary forces to operate in subordinate roles to support its US ally in distant theatres.
Dibb opposed 'tinkering' with the DOA policy, which was based firmly on the country's strategic geography; he also suggested a set of precepts to balance Australia's involvement with the United States after 9/11 that were weighted towards the specific defence needs of our region. 58 These precepts, prioritising the country's continental defence, prompted the winner of the Chief of Army Essay Competition, Major R.J. Worswick, to detail the mismatch between the defence of continental geography and operational realities with overseas deployments in the Persian Gulf and the 'coalition of the willing' in Iraq. 59 This was followed by a contribution from the Chief of Army, Peter Leahy, which questioned 'how could the strategic reality of [offshore] operational commitments in support of interests be reconciled with a rigid strategic doctrine that upheld defence of geography?' 60 This counterview against the 'concentric circles theology' did not, as anticipated by Monk, result in a strategic changing of the guard. 61 Instead the intervention of the ADF's Land Warfare Group led, as described by Major Stephanie Hodson, to the casting of Australia's strategic options in terms of 'regionalism versus globalisation'. 62 Not wanting to become entrapped in this dichotomy, Dupont nevertheless returned to the fray contending that 'geographical determinism is no substitute for sensible strategy'. 63 According to him, the ADF 'can no longer be configured solely for state on state conflicts or in the defence of the continent and immediate neighbourhood because of the compression of time and space that is the defining characteristic of a globalised world'. 64 It follows that 'our military forces must be versatile, smart, deployable over long distances and capable of protecting and sustaining themselves against all enemies, including the shadowy foes who will inhabit the urban battlefields of tomorrow'. 65 
Counter Response
In response, Dibb was forced to reiterate the importance of strategic geography to Australia's defence policy to avoid being continually tarred with the geographical determinist brush that was so generously applied to Mackinder's ideas in the past. 66 While adhering to his overriding premise that geography is still a decisive factor in the fortunes of states, he has been careful to elaborate that a country's geographical environment does not absolutely dictate a state's defence policy. 67 Rather than imposing a geographical straitjacket on defence planners, he sees the use of geography as an 'independent variable' that can provide an important guide to the prudent structuring of Australia's air, naval and land force numbers.
Also, Dibb rebutted the argument that geography is less relevant in a globalised and spatially compressed world conjured up in such phrases that declare 'distance is dead' and the 'world is flat', which together presage the 'end of geography'. 68 Even in a flattening and shrinking world, geographical location is of prime importance, and distance remains to be modified, conquered and subjugated as Australia's isolation still accounted for two-fifths of its 20 per cent gap in productivity as compared with the United States.
69 Indeed Dibb's riposte was that geography is still relevant so long as Papua New Guinea is of more strategic importance to Australia than Guinea-Bissau in Africa! This stinging remark may have had some influence on defence planners shaping the 2009 Defence White Paper, Force 2030, which sought to reconcile the strategic geography and maritime approaches of Australia's inner arc, comprising Indonesia, the south-west Pacific, Timor-Leste and New Zealand, with an emphasis on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian and disaster responses, albeit in which Defence has a supportive rather than a leading role. 70 In the process, according to Hugh White, the concentric-rings model inherited from the 1987 and 2000 Defence white papers had, by 2009, become muddled with the removal of the ring separating maritime South-East Asia from the rest of the Asia. 71 Although the DOA rhetoric was maintained, Michael Arnold 72 has suggested that there has been a discernible shift towards a broader national security agenda espoused by Dupont and Paul Reckmeyer; 73 this prompted Dibb 74 to once again repeat the importance of the inner arc in Australian defence policy and planning. Even in a global virtual world, as noted by John Quelch and Katharine Jocz, place still matters! 75 And given that troops on the ground must deal at first-hand with, and understand, the realities of local places (as in Afghanistan), local geography is of great importance at an operational level.
Looking Ahead to 2035
the mid-Indian Ocean to the mid-Pacific Ocean. 76 Without reference to the influence of either Dibb or Dupont, Rory Medcalf casts this maritime super-region as ' Australia's new strategic map', encompassing the strategic interests of China, India, Japan, Indonesia and the United States. 77 However, Chengxin Pan 78 and Yang Yi and Zhao Qinghai 79 suggest that the intent of this new political space is to contain China rather than embrace it (See Fig. 5 ).
The sheer extent of this maritime environment centred upon SouthEast Asia, as highlighted by Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, 80 raises the issue of the Australian Government's ability to provide and operationalise the necessary force structure and budget to defend the country's lines of communication and contribute to military contingencies. 81 Given this dilemma, it is hoped that a new generation of geographers will be brought into interdisciplinary teams of analysts and thinkers to evaluate the validity of this meta-geographical concept. 82 Such an intergenerational change, foreshadowed by Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, 83 would bring about Dibb's plea 84 to return geography to its proper place in defence planning in the postAfghanistan era so as to focus on the country's northern and north-western approaches, its immediate neighbours and South-East Asia. Indeed the time may be ripe for a new-style Dibb Review offering a long-term vision that defines strategic risks, approach and the role of Australia's armed forces to 2035. First and Second World Wars. Indeed his direct impact as a strategic planner on defence policy has outstripped even these luminaries. His signal contribution has been in highlighting geographical location as a key factor in reshaping the country's defence policy. Incorporating this factor into a set of principles to guide policy has enabled him to make his mark in the wider community almost in the same league as that exerted in another era by the leading American geographer Isaiah Bowman, 87 who accompanied US President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference held after the First World War in Versailles. 88 An added bonus has been his watching brief as Australia's leading academic specialist on Russian geography in which he has presciently noted the 'bear is back' and its willingness to contemplate disruption in order to expand its strategic space. This style of analysis has also been extended to commentary on China's economic, political and military affairs. 89 All political geographers from Mackinder to Dibb have emphasised the important role of 'the map' (though often one is not provided!). Neglect of the map's value has led Robert Kaplan to refer to the 'revenge of geography' from ignoring what the map tells us about coming conflicts and battles. 90 Contemporary political geographers, represented by Gerard Toal, want to go beyond this style of analysis by arguing that the resultant geographies 'cannot be considered without, at the same time, examining how economies are organized, states are governed, technological systems deployed and power distributed across the earth'. 91 This observation coincides with Dibb's plea for having political geographers as members of interdisciplinary teams to reflect upon the strategic implications of Australia's cul-de-sac position in relation to the 'Main Street' connection linking Europe, Asia and North America. 92 Geography, and geopolitics in particular, have sought to reinvent themselves in the years since Dibb was a member of the Department of Human Geography in RSPacS at ANU in 1969. 93 In the process, geography's disciplinary clout has been lost in some Australian academic centres due to amalgamations of departments with cognate disciplines and the suffusion of its identity in omnibus titles. This experience is contrary to that of their thriving counterparts, with multiple professors of geography in other centres within Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, many of whom are well versed in geopolitics. These vibrant departments have been buoyed by the use of geographical information systems, the need to address the logistical and local implications of climate change, and explorations of such contemporary topics as terror and territory. 94 Not only their output but also Dibb's life work as a political geographer in Australia should remind both governments and university decision-makers of the power of geography in public policy and discourse, and the need to ensure that it is front and centre in both teaching and research programs.
